

II. 17 September 1970 2-Point PRG Statement

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000200160005-4

SOUTH VIETNAM

It has intensified its special war in Laos, engineered the coup d'etat in Pnom Penh and openly sent U.S. troops to invade Cambodia, thus widening the war to the whole of Indochina and seriously threatening peace in Asia and the world.

The deadlock of the Paris conference on Viet Nam is imputed to the Nixon administration's policy of aggression.

Faced by U.S. obduracy and new military adventures, the Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer peoples, in response to the appeal of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference, have strengthened their solidarity and are resolved to push ahead their fight, dealing the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys with stunning return blows, and winning big victories in all fields, both militarily and politically.

The South Viet Nam people have foiled in great part the U.S. "Vietnamization" of the war, and will certainly defeat it completely.

In South Viet Nam urban centers, a widespread movement is mounting which draws in peoples of all walks of life: school children, students, newsmen, artists, writers, intellectuals, religious communities and labouring people, many personalities in political circles, even disabled veterans of the Saigon army. They demand peace, independence, neutrality, democratic liberties, improvement of the living conditions, an end to the U.S. war of aggression, U.S. withdrawal from South Viet Nam, renouncement of Thieu-Ky-Khiem and the formation in Saigon of an administration which will stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, and be prepared to engage in serious talks with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam so as to achieve peace and national concord.

Highly indignant at the Nixon administration's policy of prolonging and widening the war, and faced by the risks and disastrous effects of that policy, large sectors of the American people have waged ever stronger struggle against it. They demand that the U.S. Government put an end to the war immediately, bring the American G.I.'s home at once, and let the South Viet Nam people settle themselves their internal affairs without foreign interference.

The peoples all over the world sternly condemn the Nixon administration's policy of war and aggression, the Nixon doctrine of making Asians fight Asians. They enthusiastically support the just cause of the Indochinese peoples and demand that the U.S. withdraw rapidly from Indochina so that peace may be soon re-established in that area.

Initiatives To Make The Paris Conference Progress

To respond to the deep desire for peace of broad sectors of the people in South Viet Nam, in the United States and in the world, on the instructions of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, I would like to further elaborate on a number of points in the 10-point overall solution as follows:

1.--The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Viet Nam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, totally withdraw from South Viet Nam troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, without posing any condition whatsoever, and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Viet Nam.

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A provisional government of broad coalition is indispensable for the organization of really free and democratic general elections and also for ensuring the right to self-determination of the South Viet Nam people during the transitory period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections.

6. The provisional coalition government will include three components:

--Persons of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam.

--Persons of the Saigon administration, really standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy.

--Persons of various political and religious forces and tendencies standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy including those who, for political reasons, have to live abroad.

The provisional coalition government will implement the agreements reached by the parties.

The provisional coalition government will carry out a policy of national concord, ensure the democratic freedoms of the people, prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal, and discrimination against those who have collaborated with either side, stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people and organize general elections to form an official coalition government.

The provisional coalition government will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, practice a policy of good neighborhood with the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia, respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of these two countries. It will establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their political regime, including the United States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

7. Viet Nam is one, the Vietnamese people is one. The reunification of Viet Nam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without coercion or annexation from either side without foreign interference. The time for reunification as well as all questions relating to the reunification of the country, the two zones will re-establish normal relations in all fields on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and will respect each other's political regime, internal and external policies.

8. The parties will decide together measures aimed at ensuring the respect and the correct implementation of the provisions agreed upon.

9. After the agreement on and signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and restoring peace in Viet Nam, the parties will implement the modalities that will have been laid down for a cease-fire in South Viet Nam.

To attain a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam declares its readiness to get henceforth in touch with the forces or persons of various political tendencies and religions in the country and abroad including members of the present Saigon administration, except Thieu Ky and Khieu Tan.

10. Statement at this 84th session of the Paris conference on Viet Nam today makes clearer some of the 10-point overall solution. It faithfully reflects the Vietnamese people's legitimate demands and conforms with the aspirations for peace of the peoples of the United States and the world.

IV. 26 June 1971 DRV 9-Point Proposal (Private Meeting)
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000200160005-4
PRIVATE PROPOSAL

NORTH VIETNAMESE 9-POINT PROPOSAL
AT PRIVATE MEETING JUNE 26, 1971
MADE PUBLIC AT PARIS, JANUARY 31, 1972

1. The withdrawal of the totality of U.S. forces and those of foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries should be completed within 1971.

2. The release of all military men and civilians captured in the war should be carried out in parallel and completed at the same time as the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point 1.

3. In South Vietnam the U.S. should stop supporting Thieu/Ky/Khiem so that there may be set up in Saigon a new Administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will enter into talks with that Administration to settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam and to achieve national concord.

4. The United States Government must bear full responsibility for the damages caused by the United States to the peace of the whole of Vietnam. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam demand from the U.S. Government reparations for the damage caused by the U.S. in the two zones of Vietnam.

5. The U.S. should respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. It should stop its aggression and intervention in the Indochinese countries and let their people settle by themselves their own affairs.

6. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. As far as it is concerned, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is prepared to join in resolving such problems.

7. All the parties should achieve a cease-fire after the signing of the agreements on the above mentioned problems.

8. There should be an international supervision.

9. There should be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the neutrality of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and lasting peace in this region.

The above points form an integrated whole and are closely related to one another.

considered our proposals of October 11 a negotiating ploy and therefore, by making them public and by President Thieu publicly committing himself to this evolution, we added a crucial new ingredient to the situation which we hope may unlock some of the problems.

We may be unduly influenced by our own bureaucratic experience, but it is not unknown that governments delay acting on things unless there is some impetus that requires a decision and that if something is painful or difficult, there is a tendency to push it into the future. . . .

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you described a process of negotiation that was taking place secretly over a period of several months and then it suddenly stopped. You have received no answer from the other side from November on. Why do you think the process stopped?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me be precise about what happened. The easy explanation is that they objected to our proposal, but that could not be true, because we submitted our proposal on October 11. We received a rather conciliatory reply, not as to substance, but as to the willingness to meet, on October 25, as I recall, in which they pointed out to us that our proposed date of November 1 was not possible and for the first time in our experience with them, even

gave us the reasons why it was not possible.

Our experience has been that they would never accept the date we proposed. That has never happened, so they gave us another date and explained why that other date was preferable for them. We accepted that other date, which was November 20.

On November 17, or three days before that meeting, they notified us that Le Duc Tho was ill. Now everyone who has been engaged in these negotiations knows that in his absence no major change can occur. We tested it ourselves in our experience by meeting five times alone with Minister Xuan Thuy, whom we respect. It is no reflection on Minister Xuan Thuy, it is simply a fact of the power relationship in Hanoi, that Le Duc Tho, being a member of the Politburo, has authority that no official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has.

So . . . what happened between October 25 and November 17 . . . is a question that also occupies us.

Q. What have you done to try to contact them to try to get it started again?

Dr. Kissinger: As I have pointed out, after they turned it down on November 17, we told them on November 19 that we stood ready to meet at any time, and that we were awaiting their recommendations. We reiterated what I had said previously. We reiterated that we were not offering this

proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; but that we were prepared to consider other proposals that they might choose to make. This is the one to which they have never responded.

Since then, we have indirectly pointed out to them that the channel was still open through a number of devices that I cannot explain to you, but which were not formal communications. But there can be no question that they can be under no misapprehension that we have been prepared to meet, and I can reiterate that today.

We are still ready to resume talks in either public or private channels, or by other methods with which they are familiar. So there is no question about our readiness to negotiate.

Prospects for Settlement

Q. Two specific, related questions: One, is there any specific significance to the particular timing of this revelation; and two, given the deterioration of the military situation in Laos and Cambodia and the apparent impending military buildup on the other side for Tet, what prospect, if any, is there for getting them to terms?

Dr. Kissinger: We had always thought that if our negotiations with the other side, our secret negotiations, would not make some significant progress by the time Con-

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She said: The Saigon press has also denounced the fact that "American bombs, shells and defoliants have turned fertile areas into deserted land," "jeopardized agriculture," and "deprived the population of its means of living". . . The heavy losses suffered by five northern provinces of South Viet Nam in the recent floods were the obvious consequences of the destruction of villages and devastation of hills and woods in South Viet Nam by U.S. bombs, shells and toxic chemicals.

Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh also categorically refuted the U.S. arguments to justify its chemical warfare in South Viet Nam, and quoted the above commission's conclusion as saying, "U.S. war crimes are not isolated cases but stem from the American administration policy. That policy leads to the extermination of the Vietnamese people and turns the American soldiers into savage beasts."

After emphasizing that the Vietnamese people are more determined than ever to step up their fight to defeat the U.S. aggressors completely, Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh declared that "whether or not the Paris conference on Viet Nam moves forward depends on the serious or non-serious response of the U.S. to the fundamental question" raised in the R.S.V.N. P.R.G.'s September 17, 1970 initiative.

After delivering her prepared statement, Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh read the following declaration concerning a ceasefire:

1--Ceasefire will be carried out between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the troops and military personnel of the U.S. and the other foreign countries in the American camp immediately after the U.S. Government declares to withdraw from South Viet Nam all troops and military personnel of the U.S. and the other foreign countries of the American camp before June 30, 1971. The parties will discuss at once the question of ensuring safety for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of all U.S. troops and troops of the other foreign countries in the American camp and the problem of releasing captured militarymen.

2--Ceasefire will be carried out between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration immediately after the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and a Saigon administration without Thieu, Ky and Khiem that approves peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, agree with each other on the formation of a provisional coalition government including three components so as to organize general elections as stipulated in the R.S.V.N. P.R.G. September 17, 1970 statement.

3--The parties will define together measures to ensure the respect and correct implementation of the points agreed upon.

Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh also pointed out that the R.S.V.N. P.R.G. and the command of the South Viet Nam people's liberation army have ordered suspension of military attacks for 10 days altogether on the occasion of Christmas, New Year's Day and Tet (lunar New Year's Day).

Concerning the "proposal" made today by the U.S. and Saigon delegates for the discussion tomorrow, December 11, 1970, of the so-called "exchange of prisoners of war," Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh declared: If the U.S. declares to withdraw from South Viet Nam all U.S. troops and troops of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp before June 30 1971, the parties will discuss right today, December 10, the question of releasing captured militarymen.

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1--Regarding the deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces:

The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Viet Nam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, withdraw from South Viet Nam all troops, military personnel, weapons and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and dismantle all U.S. bases in South Viet Nam, without posing any condition whatsoever.

The U.S. Government must set a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

If the U.S. Government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities:

A) Of the withdrawal in safety from South Viet Nam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

B) Of the release of the totality of militarymen of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Viet Nam), so that they may all rapidly return to their homes.

These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

2--Regarding the question of power in South Viet Nam:

The U.S. Government must really respect the South Viet Nam people's right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam, cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon, and stop all manoeuvres, including tricks on elections, aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu.

The political, social, and religious forces in South Viet Nam aspiring to peace and national concord will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration favoring peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam will immediately enter into talks with that administration in order to settle the following questions:

A) To form a broad three-segment government of national concord that will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and will organize general elections in South Viet Nam.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration as soon as a government of national concord is established.

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On the basis of these principles, after the end of the war, South Vietnam and the United States will establish relations in the political, economic, and cultural fields.

6- Regarding the damages caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in the two zones:

The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the losses and the destructions it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

7--Regarding the respect and the international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded:

The parties will find agreement on the forms of respect and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

Ladies and gentlemen,

With this seven-point statement, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam has once again clearly shown its goodwill for peace. These correct proposals and this serious attitude will no doubt win the approval and the vigorous support of freedom- and justice-loving governments and peoples the world over.

We are firmly convinced that the South Viet Nam people, in the cities as well as in the countryside, will, together with the Provisional Revolutionary Government, struggle with all their strength to end the U.S. war of aggression, to bring about peace and independence to the fatherland, and to achieve the broad concord of the whole nation. We are confident that the North Viet Nam people will promote their union with the South Viet Nam people and will unreservedly support the correct proposals of the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. We firmly believe that the forces of freedom and peace in the United States, together with the Vietnamese people will struggle for the end of the war in Viet Nam, in the interest of the Vietnamese people, the American people, and world peace.

We call on the U.S. Government to give a serious response to the new initiative that we have put forward at this session so as [to] allow the Paris conference on Viet Nam to progress.

ELLSBERG ADMITS GIVING PENTAGON DOCUMENTS TO U.S. PRESS

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 2300 GMT 29 Jun 71 S

[Text] According to reports from the United States, American intellectual Dr Daniel Ellsberg on 28 June proudly surrendered at the federal courthouse in Boston, where he admitted that he had given the New York TIMES the classified Pentagon document that reveals the origins of the war of aggression in Vietnam, as well as the criminal, perfidious schemes and tricks of the U.S. ruling clique.

At the court, Mr Ellsberg told newsmen: "I gave the Pentagon papers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the American people through the American press."

Speaking to the large crowd of Americans who gathered at the courthouse, he said: "I gave the so-called classified Pentagon documents to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the American people. After some 9,000 more Americans had been killed. I can only regret that I did not make the information known to the American public earlier. However I have done so. I acted on my own initiative. As an American citizen, a responsible citizen, I can no longer take part in withholding this information from the American people."

v.

To be properly understood, Hobbes must be carefully read, more carefully than he often is. His reputation for consistency is not always merited, and by it one should not be misled into a vain attempt to force his ideas into a rigid mould of self-consistent doctrine. His insights are often better than his arguments; his asides, often more significant than his exercises in Euclidean definition. Yet though Hobbes merits, and requires, detailed analysis; one should not go too far in this direction. Hobbes was, in effect, his own surest critic when he wrote that "...it is not the bare words, but the scope of a writer, that giveth the true light, by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly".¹

To some extent, Hobbes' political works were, as he put it, "occasioned by the disorders" of the times in which they were written.² His writings, especially the

1. Lev. xliii 602.

2. Lev. Review & Conclusion, 713. In reading Hobbes it should not be forgotten that these "disorders" included the Thirty Years War as well as the English Civil Wars. Hobbes spent over a decade on the continent during the time the Thirty Years War was in progress and the main tenets of his political theory may all be found in the Elements of Law, which he probably wrote in 1640.

but rather by casting atoms of Scripture as dust before men's eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of them that seek not the truth, but the victory.